Nigeria’s farms are ageing faster than its economy can afford

Nigeria’s economic debate has focused heavily on japa, the emigration of skilled professionals. But a quieter shift poses a more immediate and structural threat: the ageing of the country’s farming population and the absence of a generation willing to replace it.

The data point to a system that is no longer reproducing itself. The average Nigerian farmer is now in their late 40s to early 50s, often older in practice. Meanwhile, youth participation in agriculture remains low, estimated at between 10 and 33 percent, in a country where more than 70 percent of the population is under 30. This is not a marginal imbalance. It is a breakdown in the pipeline that sustains domestic food production.

“The economic consequences are already visible. Food inflation has surged in recent years, at times exceeding 40 percent year-on-year, eroding household purchasing power and deepening poverty.”

Agriculture still employs roughly a third of Nigeria’s labour force and contributes about a quarter of gross domestic product. But its performance is constrained by persistently low productivity. Rice yields hover around 2 tonnes per hectare, roughly half the levels achieved in more efficient systems. Maize yields remain below 2 tonnes per hectare, compared with a global average closer to 5. Mechanisation is negligible, with fewer than 0.3 tractors per 1,000 hectares. Fertiliser use is similarly limited, and post-harvest losses consume as much as 40 percent of output.

These constraints are longstanding. What is new is the erosion of the human base required to sustain even current levels of production. Nigeria’s agricultural problem is no longer primarily about land or inputs. It is about people.

Young Nigerians are not abandoning farming out of apathy. They are responding rationally to incentives. Agriculture offers low and uncertain returns, high exposure to climate and security risks, limited access to finance, and weak integration into markets. By contrast, even modest urban activities, transport services, retail, and digital work provide more predictable income and quicker returns. The opportunity cost is decisive.

The result is a quiet but consequential shift in social attitudes. Farming is increasingly seen as a residual occupation rather than a viable career. Intergenerational transfer is weakening: younger family members decline to inherit farms, while older farmers continue working beyond their productive years in the absence of successors. This is not a temporary adjustment. It is a structural disengagement.

The economic consequences are already visible. Food inflation has surged in recent years, at times exceeding 40 percent year-on-year, eroding household purchasing power and deepening poverty. The World Bank has identified rising food prices as a primary driver of food insecurity. Nigeria continues to spend billions of dollars annually on food imports, despite having more than 70 million hectares of arable land. This dependence exposes the economy to currency volatility and external supply shocks.

These trends point to a policy mismatch. Monetary tightening, while necessary for macroeconomic stability, cannot address supply-side deficiencies in agriculture. Higher interest rates do not increase yields, attract labour into farming, or reduce post-harvest losses. Inflation driven by constrained food supply is not a monetary phenomenon. It is a production problem.

Other pressures, climate variability, flooding, drought, and insecurity in key producing regions, compound the challenge. But even if these were mitigated, the demographic gap would remain. The central issue is not simply how to increase output but who will produce it.

There is some evidence that participation can respond to improved incentives. Periods of favourable commodity prices have drawn younger entrants into specific crops, including cocoa, and encouraged part-time farming among urban professionals. These developments suggest that the current trajectory is not inevitable. Where agriculture becomes more profitable and less risky, labour follows.

But such responses remain limited and episodic. What is required is a systematic shift. Raising productivity must be central, through greater access to inputs, mechanisation, and technology. Reducing post-harvest losses requires investment in storage, processing, and logistics. Financing models must reflect the realities of agricultural risk, while land access constraints should be eased to lower barriers to entry.

Equally important is the question of perception. Without credible evidence that farming can provide stable and competitive returns, younger Nigerians will continue to opt out. Policy statements alone will not alter this calculus. Only sustained improvements in productivity and profitability will.

Nigeria’s economic strategy increasingly emphasises diversification and resilience. Both objectives depend, at a minimum, on a functioning domestic food system. An aging farming population, without renewal, implies declining output, rising prices, and greater reliance on imports. It also implies a more fragile macroeconomic position, with food inflation placing persistent pressure on monetary policy and household welfare.

The country’s demographic profile is often described as an advantage. That assumption is now being tested. A large youth population is only an asset if it participates productively in sectors critical to economic stability. In agriculture, that transition is not occurring at the scale required.

The question is no longer abstract: Who will feed Nigeria?

Without a credible answer, the country’s food system will not fail suddenly. It will erode quietly, steadily, and at increasing economic cost.