War, football and politics

Nigeria’s response to the scourge of Boko Haram has been like a man who is not good at calculations trying to solve an equation with hundreds of variables.

The insurgents’ tactic has been to come from northeast and attack in the northwest or southwest or north central; they strike soft targets (churches, mosques, markets, schools, bus parks etc) then withdraw when the Nigerian military advances; intermittently causing chaos almost everywhere they have intentionally multiplied the number battlefields. 

In strategy this pattern is observed in the Colonel Blotto Game. Colonel Blotto is a winner-take-all multiple strategy game theory. Two players have to simultaneously allocate resources across a number of battlefields e.g. A and B with a 100 soldiers each have to share them across three battlefields. The idea is to create a mismatch versus your opponent. Whoever distributes more resources in each battlefield wins the game. The game is applicable in real situations where the resources available to either opponent are asymmetric and the number of battlefields varies. Such situations include war, football matches and politics. 

The asymmetric conflict between the government and Boko Haram is a case in point. Boko Haram, the seemingly weaker side in terms of force and population, has adopted an unconventional approach: a guerrilla warfare strategy. It’s using physical sanctuary (mountains and porous borders) and a supportive or terrified population to launch its attacks. 

The insurgents’ chance of victory is presumed on changing the basis of competition. They avoid direct confrontation using a combination of kidnapping, IEDs and suicide bombings not necessarily to destroy the capacity of Nigerian security forces but their will. Refusing to fight a conventional war which the Nigerian military is better suited for improves their chances of victory.

They have copied best practices of other asymmetric conflicts. The method of guerrilla warfare strategy has been used by Mao Zedong in China to the Vietcong in Vietnam to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. In a battle between two unequals the weaker side’s adoption of unconventional tactics is deliberate. 

Turf wars: a do or die affair

Before the World Cup, Spain was number one on Fifa ranking. Spain arguably had the best team: 50 percent of teams in the semi-finals of the 2013/2014 Champions and Europa leagues were Spanish; the Champions League final was a Madrid derby and the La Liga was a three horse race down to the wire. Yet Spain was walloped by 5 goals to 1. Spain played their traditional formation while the Netherlands played an unconventional counterattacking formation. The Netherlands, the origin of Total Football, the precursor of tiki taka, beat Spain the masters of ball pressing and possession.  

Press and possess, these are the core principles of Spanish football. To possess the ball they first have to press. A high goal-scoring probability is determined by possession.  Possession is their best defense. Once with ball their goal is to increase the number of interactions (battlefields?). However, the Netherlands devastatingly countered this strategy.

Rinus Michels, The General, former Netherlands national coach, invented Total Football at Ajax, “Football is war”, is a famous misquotation attributed to Michels. Politics, too, has been likened to war. Is it a coincidence that a retired army general and former president of Nigeria referred to the 2007 elections as “a do or die affair?

After we did away with the Parliamentary system elections have always been a case high stakes zero-sum game: the ruling party, with a disproportionate amount of resources, thanks to the legendary opaqueness of the oil and gas sector, has won every election since 1999.

PDP has always been the favourite to win because it is resource-rich, banking on its control of income from oil, relying on favours dispensed in form of petrol subsidy and oil lifting contracts, and the allocation of oil wells all which it does not account for. 

In the Colonel Blotto game the underdog ensures there are many battlefields making the outcome uncertain. With many battlefields the weaker player (opposition) can stretch the incumbent, forcing it to thinly spread its resources. In other words, the underdog’s chances of an upset improve if it can engage the incumbent on several issues. Politics in Nigeria is limited to few battlefields – there is no difference between the ruling party and the opposition. And life is more complicated. Hence, the simpler a message the easier it is to communicate.

The danger of a single issue

Human beings are not always as rational and in search of an optimal outcome as defined by mathematical models of economists. Many different things motivate us under certain circumstances and at different stages of life. Young and old voters have different priorities and diverse things to worry about other than an election. Similarly, and just as important, a neat mathematical analysis of resources and battlefields won’t guarantee victory. While the best team or stronger side doesn’t always win statistical models don’t factor the tiniest unpredictable details that can influence an outcome. 

For Nigeria to effectively curb the Boko Haram insurgency it will have to adopt a multiple strategy. It will be a combination of military, socio-economic and political instruments. Forty attack helicopters will improve the air power and airlift capacity of the military. It will facilitate light, rapid strikes by specially trained forces, especially at night and in difficult terrains. This must be done must be done with minimum and discriminate force to secure law and order in the northeast so that socio-economic reconstruction can begin. The ultimate goal must be to win the hearts and minds of the people. 

Tayo Fagbule