Political economists are fixated with policy reform. They are interested in both the substance and the process of reform. On the former, they want to know what principles and policy actions underpin successful reforms. And on the latter, they explore the political process through which policy and institutional reforms can be achieved. The substance of any reform is its nuts and bolts, the “what to do” element. This is a crucial component because unless the policy is right the policy outcomes would be wrong. That’s basic logic! So, a pre-condition of a successful reform is that the substance is right. Thus, the reformer should have sound judgement about “what works”, that is, what policies and institutions are needed in specific circumstances to achieve the desired policy objectives. However, the ‘substance’ of a reform is not enough to ensure its success. The ‘process’ is also crucial. The “how to do it” aspect is just as important as the “what to do”. For instance, even when the substance of a reform is right, it can still fail if it’s introduced under the wrong political conditions or environment. My basic proposition, therefore, is that President Buhari’s reform efforts can only succeed if he gets both the substance and the process right.
My concern in this piece, however, is the process or the politics of Buhari’s reform agenda. There will be other times to discuss the substantive elements of the specific reform packages as they are unfolded. But the principles underpinning the politics of reform are generic, and they are my focus here. Specifically, I would argue that President Buhari should pay close attention to the political conditions under which his reforms can or cannot be achieved. But he doesn’t have to reinvent the wheel. For, as I will show in this article, there is a large body of existing knowledge about the circumstances under which major or fundamental reforms are possible. But before I discuss this, permit me to provide some political context, with some reflections on Buhari’s inaugural address, which calibrated his aspirations.
To be sure, Buhari had a successful inauguration, although, watching the event on the TV in London (thanks to NTA International and BEN TV), I felt the organisation was a bit chaotic, particularly with the problem with crowd control. But President Buhari was, as usual, dignified throughout, a figure of composure and comportment. His inaugural address was broadly well received at home, but even more so abroad. Nigeria’s international friends felt the speech touched on the key issues. President Buhari recognised the “enormous challenges” that Nigeria faces, and highlighted some of the major problems around insecurity, corruption, unemployment, and the economy, which he said was “in deep trouble”. However, he also assured Nigerians and the international community that “We are going to tackle them head on”, adding that “We can fix our problems”.
For me, the speech was just about right for an inaugural address. Of course, it was not a rousing speech, with a rhetorical flourish. Rather it was sober but idealistic. As one would expect, it was heavy on policy direction but light on policy detail. The truth is that the speech does not and cannot replace APC’s election manifesto, on which Buhari stood and was elected. At best, it should be read with the manifesto. But where there is any inconsistency or conflict the manifesto takes precedence. It is on the manifesto that Buhari and his party will be judged in four years’ time when they seek re-election!
However, given Buhari’s readiness to cover several national issues in that speech, I was surprised that he conveniently left out the issue of political and constitutional reform. This was probably deliberate. Buhari’s body language suggests he does not believe Nigeria needs any political restructuring, even though this is a key commitment in his party’s manifesto. In a recent interview with Television Continental (TVC), he lampooned the National Conference set up by former President Jonathan as one example of “how we don’t get our priorities right in this country”! For him, presumably, political and constitutional reform is not a priority issue for Nigeria. But if President Buhari thinks this way he is clearly misreading the situation. No other reform will be sustainable in Nigeria until we change the way the country is governed. Most of the country’s problems are inextricably and inexorably linked to the existing flawed political-governance structures.
As Charles Soludo, former Central Bank governor, said in a recent newspaper interview: “You can’t create the new Nigeria, a post-oil competitive economy without fundamentally altering the existing constitution”, adding that “APC cannot deliver sustainable change if it does not go to the roots, and effect systemic change”. “Tinkering at the margins will amount to papering over a cracked wall”, he said. Soludo described the current system as a “dysfunctional unitary-federalism”, and advocated what he called “competitive federalism”. I agree with him completely. As regular readers of this column would know, I am a strong believer in a new political and constitutional settlement that would create a competitive and vibrant federal structure in Nigeria.
All over the world countries are renewing themselves and improving the way they are governed. For instance, for many decades Sri Lanka practised the presidential system of government. But recently the country concluded that this was too expensive and unsuitable for its diversity: it reverted to the parliamentary system and devolved power to the regions. For any country to make real progress, it needs to be flexible, and be prepared to adapt to new challenges in a pragmatic and positive way. Let’s be clear, though, APC promised political reform, and will be held accountable for that promise!
Pardon the digression. Now, let’s get back to the subject of the politics of reform. The logic of the reform process or the politics of reform is that there are certain conditions or circumstances under which fundamental policy reforms are possible, and those under which they are not. Simply put, structural transformation cannot be achieved unless the political or policy environment is right. In a book, The Political Economy of Policy Reform, edited by the economist John Williamson, several senior scholars examined the specific reform processes in individual countries where major reforms had been successfully introduced. They found similarities in the political processes that preceded and accompanied such reforms in those countries. What emerged from these case studies were a set of general principles or hypotheses about the reform process. Let’s briefly discuss these hypotheses, which are relevant to the Nigerian situation.
The first is the crisis hypothesis. This is, indeed, the leading hypothesis about when policy reform may be possible. The American economist and social scientist Mancur Olson argued that only a major crisis can jolt a country out of its tendency to become sclerotic, and trigger a fundamental policy reform. Indeed, several countries have embarked on major reforms on the back of an acute crisis. For instance, when the UK Conservative party took over power from the Labour party in 2010, it inherited an annual budget deficit of about £170 billion and a national debt of about £1 trillion. There was a consensus that these levels of debt and deficit were unacceptably high, and that unless something drastic was done Britain could face a financial meltdown like Greece. The crisis thus triggered the deep deficit-reduction and fiscal consolidation programme introduced by the Tory-led coalition government. A similar or even more acute situation now exists in Nigeria.
Olu Fasan
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