Much has been said about the recently-concluded and by-and-large peaceful and successful elections Nigeria has just conducted. In this article, I explore the under-discussed and possibly politically-incorrect themes and issues from the exercise.
The soldiers are back: The president-elect Muhammadu Buhari is of course a former general and military head of state and the only career he has had other than his more recent involvement in politics was in the military. One of his most strategic (and for the loser, incumbent President Jonathan, devastating) allies was former military and civilian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, who severely undermined Jonathan with his pronouncements, national connections and international profile. There were other “active duty” though retired military personnel – former Brigadier General Olagunsoye Oyinlola who switched sides to critical impact in Osun State; General Alani Akinrinade who defended Buhari from allegations of certificate forgery and rallied his Yoruba constituency in favour of Buhari and Tinubu; General Dambazau who organized the Buhari campaign’s security operations; General Aliyu Gusau and Colonel Sambo Dasuki who were nominally on Jonathan’s side, but whose real preferences may be clearer in future; and (former police Inspector-General) Ibrahim Coomasie who organized Arewa to stand solidly behind Buhari. Even the current Sultan of Sokoto, Abubakar, was a former military intelligence officer.
Lt. General Jeremiah Useni is now a senator-elect and General T. Y. Danjuma brashly reminded us that what we had just witnessed was a civil war without guns in which one side won, and the loser conceded! Former military head of state General Abdulsalam Abubakar and his peace committee (which included former chief of general staff, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe) became an unofficial transitional government procuring Jonathan’s “surrender”, addressing military service chiefs and superintending affairs of state.
In a 1998 interview with ‘The News’, then Senator Bola Tinubu who had just returned from exile after Abacha’s death reflected on the betrayal of the “June 12 Movement” by Abacha thus: “There is one big lesson. We have to understand the antecedent of the military, particularly the Nigerian Army. The military Generals were trained to deceive, they take every opposition as enemy, and they deceive you. You have to be cynical in every political dispensation or arrangement; you have to distrust the military. In their professional calling, normal duty, respect them. But in any political arrangement, don’t ever rely on any military ‘friend’.” Well, we all have to hope he was wrong, because the whole nation now depends on retired military officers!
“Biafra” lost again: As I mentioned above, General Danjuma undiplomatically exposed the mindset of some of those involved in the 2015 elections about the essence of the contest by comparing Jonathan’s concession to Ojukwu’s failure to surrender after the fall of Enugu during the civil war. It is somewhat uncanny that the territory that voted for Jonathan in the elections was with minor exceptions roughly equivalent to the territory that Ojukwu proclaimed as Biafra. The PDP’s remit is today basically the South-East and South-South and like during the civil war, the Yoruba West essentially allied with the North.
New (and old) principalities and powers: Nigeria has been ruled since 1966 by a small clique of military officers and their friends and agents. 2015 was the point at which a new set of “powers” finally and fully joined that clique. The most notable entrant into our national power oligarchy is of course Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, but there are others – Governor-elect Nasir El-Rufai, Governors Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, Rotimi Amaechi and (also Senators) Bukola Saraki and George Akume, Emir of Kano HRM Sanusi, Yemi Osinbajo and few others may now join the old brigade: Obasanjo, Buhari, Abubakar Atiku, Ibrahim Babangida, Danjuma, etc. in Nigeria’s power clique.
Jonathan – naivety or statesmanship: On December 19, 2012, I wrote an article focused on outgoing President Goodluck Jonathan titled “Naivety and statecraft” in which I noted the now defeated incumbent’s extreme naivety and his tendency to take decisions which were contrary to his self-interest and indeed to the advantage of his adversaries. In the event, Jonathan was undone by this dysfunctionality as he surrounded himself with a combination of friends who couldn’t help him; enemies who were seeking to destroy him; and “frenemies” who were friends during the daytime and enemies at night! It now seems apparent from his conduct and words that Jonathan was tired of being “in a cage” in Abuja and had no stomach for politics and elections. In the circumstances, his supporters particularly in the South-South and South-East will wonder why he didn’t summon the courage to opt out of the race and allow PDP select another candidate, instead of half-heartedly leading them into a battle he lacked the will to win. In any event Jonathan’s saving grace in the eyes of historians will be his decision to quickly concede defeat rather than plunge the nation into a terrible conflict.
A concerted Northern effort: It is clear from the results (and indeed the process) that there was unanimity in the North that it was time to “retrieve” power in the overall interest of the region, and everyone (or at least nearly everyone) including several who were presumed independent or on Jonathan’s side fell in line. From the Northern, particularly Hausa-Fulani, point of view, this was a 1960 (securing national power at independence) or 1970 (defeating Ojukwu’s resistance of Northern hegemony) moment. Like in 1970, victory was achieved with support from the de facto political leader of the Yorubas (Awolowo then; Tinubu now), even though Awolowo was out of government within roughly a year of the end of the war!
Division in Yorubaland: The South-West went into the 2015 elections divided into APC versus PDP; Afenifere Renewal Group (ARG) versus Afenifere; OPC/Afenifere versus Yoruba Assemby, etc. and the results show an almost even split even though APC may have secured the overall majority in the presidential and governorship elections. Now APC has four states (Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Osun) to PDP’s two (Ondo and Ekiti). Nevertheless, Tinubu secured overall bragging rights – his side winning the presidency; retaining the Lagos prize; threatening Mimiko in Ondo; and putting Ayo Fayose on the defensive in Ekiti.
Tinubu’s grand victory: That brings us to Asiwaju Bola Tinubu for whom the victory of the APC in 2015 may be said to be a personal strategic triumph. History will have to record that Tinubu was without doubt the most important single individual in orchestrating the transformation of the AD/AC which controlled only one state in 2003; to an ACN which had won six states by 2011; conceptualized the merger of the ACN, CPC and ANPP with elements of APGA and defectors from the PDP into the All Progressives Congress (APC), a party able to effectively challenge and has now defeated the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) after its hitherto unchallenged 16-year reign. Tinubu may however still have to fight to define and protect his final place in history depending on how events play out within the government he has helped create. Whether you supported Tinubu or not, everyone will have to agree that the 2015 elections bear his most indelible stamp!
APC – New bottle, old wine?… plus Buhari and Osinbajo: It remains to be seen how the APC will prove itself to be different from the ousted and dysfunctional PDP. Yes, APC can validly claim a qualitative difference in quality of governance in some of the states it governs especially in the South-West. But that is not universal! Some of the worst-governed states in the country (e.g., the Boko Haram enclave states in the North-East) were from the legacy ANPP; Nasarawa, a CPC/APC state, has not experienced better governance than in the North-East; the overwhelming poverty and illiteracy in the North-West cannot be evidence of good leadership or governance; beyond noise and bluster, Rochas Okorocha has not made substantive impact on the lives of Imo citizens; an unduly large number of APC old and new officeholders came from the PDP and have little to recommend them; and the two individuals most symbolic of PDP’s 16 years in power, Obasanjo and Atiku, are de facto or de jure APC members. In substance, the difference perhaps has to be Buhari’s reputation for incorruptibility and discipline, and Yemi Osinbajo’s integrity, intellect and commitment to good governance. Hopefully, those might suffice. Or perhaps the party may rise to the weight of its historical responsibility.
Osinbajo, RCCG and the Christian/Pentecostal vote: I suspected from long before his nomination that Yemi Osinbajo (SAN) might be selected as APC presidential running-mate and said so to several friends and associates. As someone who was not inclined to support Buhari, I silently hoped I would be spared the dilemma of Osinbajo’s choice, which I knew would be a positive addition to the Buhari ticket. And it was! Professor Osinbajo’s selection dissolved much opposition to Buhari’s candidacy in Christian/Pentecostal circles and eliminated the General’s most significant weakness in Southern Nigeria. It also put the APC presidential candidate in a stronger competitive position in Western Nigeria and brought an important constituency, lawyers, broadly in support of the ticket. One can now only hope that he would play a commensurate role in the emerging presidency.
The role of propaganda: This was one Nigerian election that was decided largely on account of propaganda and messaging! The APC’s “change” message was compelling and the campaign stayed on message throughout the campaign. This effective message was complemented with devastating deployment of propaganda, often false or contrived but which most voters believed. President Jonathan’s and PDP’s communication machinery was in response hapless! A case study needs to be written on how a government with a fair performance in terms of policy was so abject in terms of strategy and communication that it became universally adjudged a failure with its defining adjectives being “incompetent”, “clueless”, “corrupt” and “failed”; and how a ruling party could be so completely incoherent in its communication that it soon became portrayed in the media (and sometimes in its own mindset) as a de facto opposition party. The election also marked the coming of age of social media as a critical force in Nigerian politics, for good or bad! With regard to conventional media, academics may have to examine whether it acted as an activist and vanguard media, scrutinizing the candidates and issues on the basis of national interest, or as mechanisms of propaganda. Civil society having allied virtually completely with the victorious opposition will struggle to redefine its role as social conscience now that its allies will form government.
The global connection: The international community was clearly deeply involved in the 2015 Nigerian elections. The US government of Barack Obama and its ambassador in Nigeria could barely hide their preference and sometimes intervened in the manner of a colonial viceroy in the electoral process. In fact, the inclinations of the US government were long discernible from the words and actions of Obama, Johnny Carson and Hillary Clinton (before they left the State Department) and Susan Rice. The UK and some African countries also got in on the action – South Africa, Morocco, Chad and Niger showed by their body language what outcomes they preferred. In this regard, perhaps it was better that the incumbent lost – a sitting government that had lost the confidence of all these nations would have found it difficult to govern. Actually, the Jonathan government was already finding otherwise normal activities complicated with the US blocking arms purchases; South Africa seizing sovereign funds; and neighbours refusing to cooperate in the anti-Boko Haram effort until compelled by France.
Some negatives in the mix: Perhaps history will reveal the persons and groups who funded and supported Boko Haram; perhaps not? We may one day know who kidnapped the “Chibok” girls, or we may never know? The “Fulani Herdsmen” phenomenon continues unabated in vast swathes of North and Central Nigeria killing thousands of innocent citizens. All of these factors had an impact on the elections and its outcome, meaning that terrorism was perhaps successfully employed to impact political choices. That cannot be a good precedent. I wrote earlier about acute deployment of propaganda – today it is almost impossible to separate truth from fiction, at least in the minds of most Nigerians. We may also have seen significant electoral gerrymandering over voter registration, distribution of Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) and actual voting and logistics, all of which may influence the evolution of our democracy and governance for some time to come. On the other hand, we had the (eventually) successful (in many polling districts, not all) introduction of card readers into Nigeria’s electoral process.
The 2015 election has come and gone. In many respects, it has been unprecedented – a contest between two equally matched national parties; defeat of and concession by an incumbent president; a coalition between Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba mainstream political groups; significant youth involvement and participation; the role of technology and new media; and active international involvement. The long-term implications of 2015 on Nigeria’s political and economic development will now unfold.
Opeyemi Agbaje
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